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Foreword 
 
This paper is not intended to be a complete overview of its subject area.  
It is being prepared as a written accompaniment to a talk to be given at 
the Value Added Network Services for Europe Conference, due to take place 
on September 12th and 13th 1989 in London.  All presenters of papers at 
this conference have been requested to provide a 1500-word synopsis of 
their talk for circulation to attendees at the conference. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe security in electronic mail 
applications, with particular reference to the security facilities in the 
1988 versions of the CCITT X.400 Recommendations, [2].  The two main 
objectives of this paper are first to provide tutorial information on the 
security facilities within the 1988 X.400 Recommendations and second to 
point out potential shortcomings in the protocols and areas where 
improvements can be made. 
 
We devote the remainder of this introduction to a brief review of the 
fundamental concepts underlying electronic mail systems.  In doing so we 
use the X.400 model and terminology, which can be applied to a variety of 
other electronic mail systems. 
 
The 1984 version of the X.400 recommendations, [1], defines two basic 
types of entity in a 'store and forward' mail network, namely User Agents 
(UAs) and Message Transfer Agents (MTAs).  UAs originate and receive 
messages on behalf of users.  All messages are sent via one or more MTAs, 
which act as 'store and forward' message nodes.  The set of all MTAs 
collectively form what is known as the Message Transfer Service (MTS). 
 
X.400 is widely used as a generic term for a collection of related 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendations, including X.400 itself, X.402, X.411, X.413 
and X.420, [2].  The protocols governing communication between pairs of 
MTAs and between a UA and the MTS are defined in X.411.  The protocol 
governing MTAÄMTA communications is often referred to as P1, and the 
UAÄMTA protocol as P3.  The entire collection of UAs and MTAs is referred 
to as the Message Handling System (MHS). 
 
In the 1988 version of the X.400 Recommendations, in fact in X.413, a 
third type of entity is defined, namely a Message Store (MS).  Message 
Stores were not part of the 1984 version of X.400.  In some cases it is 
convenient to only connect a UA to the MTS at very infrequent intervals.  
However MTAs may only store mail for recipient UAs for a short period of 
time.  The role of a MS is to remedy this problem by acting as an 
intermediary between a UA and the MTS, with storage of received messages 
as its primary role.  UAs and MSs are in 1-1 correspondence, and an MS 
enables its corresponding UA to obtain summary information about received 
messages without actually retrieving them.  In practice, an MS is likely 
to be co-located either with an MTA or with its corresponding UA.  The 
Message Store Access Protocol, governing the retrieval of messages by a 
UA from its corresponding MS, is defined in Recommendation X.413.  Note 
that UAs and MSs are collectively referred to as MTS-users, in that they 
are both end-users of the Message Transfer Service. 
 
All the protocols so far discussed, namely those in X.411 and X.413, have 
the role of defining how an object called a message-content is shipped 
from one UA to another.  The form of this content is not constrained by 
X.411 or X.413, and may be one of a number of different types.  Its value 
is not affected by the MTS.  One such type is defined in X.420; this type 
is defined as suitable for use in Inter-Personal Messaging applications.  
Other content types will be defined for different applications such as 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 
 
Finally note that the set of parameters defined in X.411 and X.413, which 
accompany the message content when it is transferred from one MHS entity 
to another, are often referred to as the message envelope.  This is 
because in many ways these parameters have roles analogous to those of 
the addressing and franking information to be found on the  envelope of a 
piece of 'conventional' mail. 
 
 
2.  Security services 
 
Before describing electronic mail security services in detail, it is 
useful to consider what threats these services are intended to address.  
Possible threats to electronic mail systems include:  masquerade, message 
replay/re-sequencing, modification of message information, denial of 
service, leakage of information and repudiation.  It is not possible to 
address all these threats from within a message handling application.  
For example information leakage will take place if it is possible to 
monitor the volumes of traffic going from one point in the network to 
another, even if all the message contents are encrypted.  To prevent this 
requires the provision of security services in the lower layers of the 
OSI stack, which is beyond the scope of application services. 
 
There are a considerable number of different security services that could 
be provided within an electronic mail system.  Such services may 
conveniently be divided into two classes, namely MTS-user to MTS-user 
services and MTS services.  Note that this is non-standard terminology. 
 
MTS-user to MTS-user services are those provided from one MTSÄuser (i.e. 
a UA or an MS) to another, without active intervention by the MTS.  Such 
services include:  Message origin authentication, Proof of delivery, 
Content confidentiality, Content integrity, Message sequence integrity 
and Non-repudiation services. 
 
MTS security services are those provided which involve active 
intervention by the MTS.  Such services include:  Secure access control, 
Report origin authentication, Probe origin authentication, Proof of 
submission, Non-repudiation of submission and Message security labelling. 
 
The service names used here are those given in the X.400 Recommendations 
which do not correspond precisely with the names used in ISO 7498-2, the 
OSI security architecture, [3].  This is partly because the OSI security 
architecture does not mention all the services relevant to electronic 
mail, and partly because the documents were developed in parallel. 
 
 
3.  Approaches to providing security 
 In order to provide security services for the message content it is 
normally necessary to transmit with the message a number of 'security 
parameters', e.g. encrypted keys and authentication checks.  These 
security parameters can either be transmitted in the message envelope or 
as part of a (specially formatted) message content, or both.  The choice 
of location for the security parameters not only has important system 
ramifications, but can also affect the type of security service which may 
be provided. 
 
If security services are required for X.400-1984, or other electronic 
mail systems without built in security facilities, then there is no 
alternative but to put the security parameters in the message content.  
The same is true for any heterogeneous mail systems, even if they 
individually incorporate security features.  Examples of electronic mail 
systems in which all the security parameters are in the message content 
are provided by the SDNS and IAB Internet mail security proposals.  
However, security parameters within the message content cannot be used to 
provide MTS security services. 
 
On the other hand, the 1988 X.400 Recommendations use the message 
envelope to transfer security parameters, and not the message content.  
The inclusion of the security parameters in the message envelope enables 
the provision of MTS security services.  However, it does make the 
provision of certain MTS-user to MTS-user services rather problematical, 
especially if Message Stores are used. 
 
 
4.  Security mechanisms 
 
Before we consider the security mechanisms described in the X.400 
Recommendations, we need to consider the provision of cryptographic key 
management, a fundamental requirement for the provision of communications 
security services.  Key management for the X.400 security facilities is 
provided by use of the directory authentication service specified in 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendation X.509.  This key management system is based on 
the use of public key cryptosystems for digital signature and data 
encryption.  Recommendation X.509 allows public keys to be stored in user 
directory entries. 
 
Since the directory service (and communications with it) may not be 
trusted, means need to be provided for users to verify public keys read 
from the directory.  This is provided for by the use of data structures 
called certificates, which we now briefly describe. 
 
In order to set up a key management system for X.400, every user who 
wants to use security services must first exchange public keys with an 
off-line entity called a Certification Authority (CA).  Each user must 
trust the CA which they appoint to act on their behalf.  The CA gives the 
user a copy of its public key (each CA has its own public key/secret key 
pair), and is given in return a copy of the user's public key (each user 
must also equip themselves with a key pair).  The CA then signs a copy of 
the user's public key, together with the user's name and the period of 
validity of the key, using the CA's secret key.  This forms a certificate 
and is actually what is put in the directory.  Any other user which has a 
trusted copy of this CA's public key can then check the validity of the 
certificate, and thereby obtain a verified copy of the user's public key. 
 
The scheme so far described does not cover the situation where two users 
are served by different CAs.  To cover this possibility, one CA may 
generate a certificate for another CA's public key; such certificates are 
called 'cross-certificates'.  If user A has CA X, and user B has CA Y, 
then if A is given a cross-certificate containing Y's public key signed 
by X, then A can obtain a verified copy of Y's public key.  A can then 
check B's certificate.  Such cross-certificates can be made into chains 
called 'certification paths'. 
 
Virtually all the security services built into the X.400 Recommendations 
make use of a cryptographic construct called a token.  Tokens are always 
formed for a single recipient.  A token consists of a series of data 
fields with a digital signature appended, this signature being computed 
as a function of all the data fields in the token (using the originator's 
secret key).  These data fields include:  recipient-name, date/time of 
generation, a field called 'signed-data' and a field called 'encrypted-
data'.  The information within the encrypted-data field is enciphered 
using the public key of the intended recipient of the token (prior to 
computation of the signature). 
 
One form of token is called a message-token, and is used in the provision 
of all the MTS-user to MTS-user security services.  Hence, if a message 
requires such services, then a message-token is sent as one parameter 
within the message envelope.  The precise contents of the signed-data and 
encrypted-data fields within the message-token depend on which selection 
of security services is required.  However, whichever services are 
required, the presence of these data within the token prevents them from 
being changed and/or repudiated. 
 
In a message-token, the encrypted-data field may be used to contain any 
of the following items:  a cryptographic key (used to encrypt the message 
content if content confidentiality is required), a content integrity 
check (used in the provision of content integrity), a message security 
label, a content integrity key (used to compute the content integrity 
check) and a message sequence number (used in the provision of message 
sequence integrity).  The signed-data field may be used to contain any of 
the following items:  a content integrity check (used in the provision of 
content integrity), a message security label, a message sequence number 
(used in the provision of message sequence integrity) and a proof of 
delivery request. 
 
The proof of delivery and non-repudiation of delivery services are 
slightly different from other MTS-user to MTS-user services in that they 
are provided by the message recipient to the message originator.  If a 
message is received containing a proof of delivery request (in the 
signed-data field of the message token) then the recipient computes a 
signed version of the (unencrypted) message content together with other 
delivery related parameters.  This signature, computed using the 
recipient's secret key, is returned to the message originator within the 
delivery report.  The message originator then uses this signature to 
provide the required service(s). 
 
Means are also provided within X.411 and X.413 for a pair of MHS entities 
to perform peer-entity-authentication prior to opening a connection for 
the exchange of messages.  This protocol exchange again involves the use 
of tokens.  For systems providing Mandatory Access Control services, all 
messages and entities can be assigned security labels.  These labels can 
be tied to message contents by their inclusion in either the encrypted-
data or signed-data fields of the message token (depending on whether or 
not the label itself is confidential).  Inter-entity connections can also 
be assigned security-labels using the tokens exchanged in the peer-
entity-authentication process. 
 
 
5.  Limitations of security in X.400-1988 
 
We conclude this paper by very briefly mentioning three important 
limitations of the current X.400 Recommendations. 
 
First, proof of delivery to a UA is not available when an MS is used.  
Because of the way the protocols operate, the proof of delivery must be 
generated at the time the message is delivered by the MTS to the MTS-
user.  If this MTS-user is an MS, then it must generate and sign the 
delivery proof, and not the end user.  The message originator then has no 
proof that the message was ever delivered to the recipient UA, only to 
the MS belonging to the recipient UA. 
 
Second, proof of delivery by an MS is not possible if the message content 
is encrypted.  The proof of delivery must be computed using the 
unencrypted message content, which will not be available to the MS 
(unless the MS is equipped with the UA's secret key). 
 
Third, the specified form of token may allow the 'theft' of message 
content by third parties.  This arises because the signature on the token 
is computed after the secret data (in the encrypted-data field) is 
enciphered.  The problem would not arise if the order of these two 
operations was reversed. 
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